Shadows still remain

In a day that was supposed to provide many answers to Major League Baseball's doping problem, former senator George Mitchell's 409-page report raises even more questions within the sport's steroid era

For months, we speculated what names would be revealed in Mitchell's steroid investigation. We all had our opinions. We all had our hand-picked guaranteed "juicers" off the record.

So now that 86 players were linked to performance-enhancing drug use, are you really surprised by the names?

Barry Bonds, Miguel Tejada, Eric Gagne, Andy Pettitte, and the biggest name of the entire report, Roger Clemens, were some of the few notables listed.

Shocker.

If you feel violated or abused by the absence of any unsuspected big names, raise your hand. You're not the only one. In fact, the build-up to this report was something I've never witnessed in my young career as a journalist. But at the end of the day, it just didn't live up to its potential.

The purpose of Mitchell's investigation was supposed to reveal baseball's steroid and HGH (human growth hormone) problem. Instead of giving us answers, it's led to even more questions, thus, pondering the purpose of the overall report and its delivery.

As someone who's accepted the fact that performance-enhancing drugs are prevalent in professional sports, especially baseball, I was expecting the release of obvious names. I was giddy at the fact that this report was going to open the eyes of those naive fans that hold Bonds accountable for all the world's problems. I wanted to see a purpose for this report and the investigation's findings.

Instead, I find myself asking even more questions, and none bigger than this: What now?

Did Mitchell really set us up for a couple years worth of back and forth accusations between Clemens' lawyers and investigative reporters? Do we really have to wait for another high-profile book explaining one of the game's best players and his steroid addictions? That certainly wasn't what this was all about, but unfortunately, that's exactly what it's turned out to be.

So instead of going out and gathering players names that shock the baseball world, Mitchell provided us with a little of both extremes: the really obvious names, and the names that nobody really cares about, hence, not proving anything that we didn't already know.

I would hope the purpose of the investigation wasn't to tell the world that Brian Roberts informed Larry Bigbie he injected himself once or twice with steroids in 2003. Or that Bonds had "used the clear more than once."

The large amount of smaller names on the list, combined with the very few, and expected, big names doesn't do any justice in teaching the public about the league's steroid problem. The report is misleading because while 86 is a large number, these names really don't open any eyes, and it's only a small percentage of the entire league's usage.

You've got to be joking if you never thought it was unusual that Clemens continued to pitch at such a high level as he aged into his 40's, even getting better at times. You heard the whispers. You had an idea. He was on your "I'm not going to be shocked" list of potential users.

The same goes for Tejada and Lenny Dykstra. And we already knew about Jason Giambi, Gary Sheffield, and Bonds. Maybe, just maybe a name like Pettitte was a step in the right direction. More impact players like that would have been an eye-opener. But that's about as exciting as the list gets.

When asked to comment Thursday afternoon, Clemens' and Pettitte's agent, Randy Hendricks, sent me this statement on Pettitte: "I have advised Andy that as an active player, he should refrain from commenting until we have had an opportunity to speak with his union and other advisors. At the appropriate time, he will have something to say."

Pettitte admitted Saturday that he used HGH in 2002 to help recover from an elbow injury, and not to try and gain a competitive edge.

Hendricks also sent me a release from Clemens' agent, vehemently denying the allegations from the Mitchell report that said he used both steroids and HGH from 1998-2001.

"Roger has been repeatedly tested for these substances and he has never tested positive. There has never been one shred of tangible evidence that he ever used these substances and yet he is being slandered today," said Clemens' attorney Rusty Hardin. "The use of steroids in sports is a serious problem, it is wrong and it should be stopped," Hardin said. "However, I am extremely upset that Roger’s name was in this report based on the allegations of a troubled and unreliable witness who only came up with names after being threatened with possible prison time."

In Mitchell's report, Brian McNamee, who served as the personal trainer to both Pettitte and Clemens, admitted that he injected both players with performance-enhancing drugs . Mitchell held three interviews with McNamee after being identified as one of Kirk Radomski's customers. Radomski was the former New York Mets employee who on April 26, 2007, plead guilty to selling anabolic steroids and HGH to professional baseball players.

The following are excerpts directly from the Mitchell report on both Pettitte and Clemens:

Roger Clemens

Roger Clemens signed with Toronto in 1997, after spending the first thirteen years of his career with the Red Sox. After McNamee began working for the Blue Jays in 1998, he and Clemens both lived at the Toronto SkyDome (there is a hotel attached to the stadium). McNamee and Clemens became close professionally while in Toronto, but they were not close socially or personally.

Jose Canseco was playing for the Blue Jays in 1998. On or about June 8-10, 1998, the Toronto Blue Jays played an away series with the Florida Marlins. McNamee attended a lunch party that Canseco hosted at his home in Miami. McNamee stated that, during this luncheon, he observed Clemens, Canseco, and another person he did not know meeting inside Canseco’s house, although McNamee did not personally attend that meeting. Canseco told members of my investigative staff that he had numerous conversations with Clemens about the benefits of Deca-Durabolin and Winstrol and how to “cycle” and “stack” steroids. Canseco has made similar statements publicly.

Toward the end of the road trip which included the Marlins series, or shortly after the Blue Jays returned home to Toronto, Clemens approached McNamee and, for the first time, brought up the subject of using steroids. Clemens said that he was not able to inject himself, and he asked for McNamee’s help.

Later that summer, Clemens asked McNamee to inject him with Winstrol, which Clemens supplied. McNamee knew the substance was Winstrol because the vials Clemens gave him were so labeled. McNamee injected Clemens approximately four times in the buttocks over a several-week period with needles that Clemens provided. Each incident took place in Clemens’ apartment at the SkyDome. McNamee never asked Clemens where he obtained the steroids.

During the 1998 season (around the time of the injections), Clemens showed McNamee a white bottle of Anadrol-50.386 Clemens told McNamee he was not using it but wanted to know more about it. McNamee told Clemens not to use it. McNamee said he took the bottle and gave it to Canseco. McNamee does not know where Clemens obtained the Anadrol-50.

According to McNamee, from the time that McNamee injected Clemens with Winstrol through the end of the 1998 season, Clemens’s performance showed remarkable improvement. During this period of improved performance, Clemens told McNamee that the steroids “had a pretty good effect” on him. McNamee said that Clemens also was training harder and dieting better during this time.

In 1999, Clemens was traded to the New York Yankees. McNamee remained under contract with the Blue Jays for the 1999 season. In 2000, the Yankees hired McNamee as the assistant strength and conditioning coach under Jeff Mangold. According to McNamee, the Yankees hired him because Clemens persuaded them to do so. In this capacity, McNamee worked with all of the Yankees players. McNamee was paid both by the Yankees and by Clemens personally. Clemens hired McNamee to train him during portions of several weeks in the off-season. McNamee also trained Clemens personally for one to two weeks during spring training and a few times during the season. McNamee served as the Yankees’ assistant strength and conditioning coach through the 2001 season.

According to McNamee, during the middle of the 2000 season Clemens made it clear that he was ready to use steroids again. During the latter part of the regular season, McNamee injected Clemens in the buttocks four to six times with testosterone from a bottle labeled either Sustanon 250 or Deca-Durabolin that McNamee had obtained from Radomski.

McNamee stated that during this same time period he also injected Clemens four to six times with human growth hormone he received from Radomski, after explaining to Clemens the potential benefits and risks of use. McNamee believed that it was probably his idea that Clemens try human growth hormone. Radomski instructed McNamee how to inject human growth hormone. On each occasion, McNamee administered the injections at Clemens’ apartment in New York City.

McNamee said that he and Clemens did not have any conversations regarding performance enhancing substances from late 2000 until August 2001. McNamee did, however, train Clemens and Andy Pettitte during the off-season at their homes in Houston. Clemens often invited other major league players who lived in the Houston area to train with him.

According to McNamee, Clemens advised him in August 2001 that he was again ready to use steroids. Shortly thereafter, McNamee injected Clemens with Sustanon or Deca-Durabolin on four to five occasions at Clemens’s apartment. According to McNamee, he again obtained these drugs from Kirk Radomski. McNamee concluded from Clemens’s statements and conduct that Clemens did not like using human growth hormone (Clemens told him that he did not like the “bellybutton shot”). To McNamee’s knowledge, Clemens did not use human growth hormone in 2001.

McNamee was not retained by the Yankees after the 2001 season. After that season, Clemens never again asked McNamee to inject him with performance enhancing substances, and McNamee had no further discussions with Clemens about such substances. McNamee stated that Clemens did not tell him why he stopped asking him to administer performance enhancing substances, and McNamee has no knowledge about whether Clemens used performance enhancing substances after 2001.

Clemens continued to train with McNamee after he was dismissed by the Yankees, according to both McNamee and press reports. In October 2006, after the Los Angeles Times reported that the names of Clemens and McNamee were among those that had been redacted from an affidavit in support of a search warrant for the residence of Jason Grimsley as allegedly involved with the illegal use of performance enhancing substances, Clemens was reported to have said: “I’ll continue to use Mac [McNamee] to train me. He’s one of a kind.”

McNamee was quoted in a December 10, 2006 news article on steroids as reportedly having said: “I never, ever gave Clemens or Pettitte steroids. They never asked me for steroids. The only thing they asked me for were vitamins." McNamee told us that he was accurately quoted but that he did not tell the truth to the reporter who interviewed him. He explained that he was trying to protect his reputation.

On May 15, 2007, the New York Daily News reported that Clemens had cut ties to McNamee. McNamee denied that and told us that he trained Clemens after the article was published. He added that Clemens now has a home in the New York area, and McNamee personally installed a gym there.

McNamee stated that he has no ill will toward Clemens and “was always ahead [financially] with Roger.” McNamee received money for expenses from Clemens’s business representatives. They paid McNamee for training Clemens, and for his expenses. From time to time Clemens also gave McNamee “extra money.” Clemens never gave money to McNamee specifically to buy performance enhancing substances.

Kirk Radomski recalled meeting McNamee through David Segui. Radomski confirmed that he supplied McNamee with human growth hormone and anabolic steroids from 2000 to 2004. Although McNamee never told Radomski the performance enhancing substances obtained were for anything other than McNamee’s personal use, Radomski concluded that McNamee was distributing the substances to others based on the amounts he purchased and the timing of the purchases.

Radomski knew McNamee was acting as personal trainer for Roger Clemens, Andy Pettitte, and Chuck Knoblauch (among others), and he suspected McNamee was giving the performance enhancing substances to some of his clients. Occasionally, McNamee acknowledged good performances by Knoblauch or Clemens by “dropping hints,” such as “[he’s] on the program now.” McNamee never explicitly told Radomski that either Clemens or Pettitte was using steroids or human growth hormone. According to Radomski, however, McNamee asked Radomski what types of substances Radomski was providing to pitchers.

Radomski delivered the substances to McNamee personally. Radomski recalled numerous performance enhancing substance transactions with McNamee.

Radomski produced four checks from McNamee that were deposited into Radomski’s checking account and drawn on McNamee’s checking account. All the checks were dated in 2003 and 2004, after McNamee said that he supplied Clemens, Pettitte, and Knoblauch. McNamee said these purchases were for non-baseball clients.

McNamee’s name, with an address and telephone number, is listed in the address book seized from Radomski’s residence by federal agents. Radomski’s telephone records show twelve calls to McNamee’s telephone number from May through August 2004. Radomski was unable to obtain telephone records dating back to the time when, according to McNamee, McNamee was injecting Clemens.

Clemens appears to be one of the two people associated with baseball – Andy Pettitte is the other – who have remained loyal to McNamee after he left the Yankees. Clemens has remained a source of income for McNamee up to and including 2007.

Prior to my interviews of McNamee he was interviewed by federal officials on several occasions, during each of which they informed McNamee that he risked criminal prosecution if he was not truthful. I was advised by those officials that on each occasion he told them about the performance enhancing substance use of Clemens, Andy Pettitte, and Chuck Knoblauch.

In order to provide Clemens with information about these allegations and to give him an opportunity to respond, I asked him to meet with me; he declined.

Andy Pettitte

McNamee began serving as Pettitte’s personal trainer and started assisting Pettitte in off-season workouts after the 1999 season. According to McNamee, during the 2001-02 off-season, Pettitte asked him about human growth hormone. McNamee said that he discouraged Pettitte from using human growth hormone at that time.

From April 21 to June 14, 2002, Pettitte was on the disabled list with elbow tendonitis. McNamee said that Pettitte called him while Pettitte was rehabilitating his elbow in Tampa, where the Yankees have a facility, and asked again about human growth hormone. Pettitte stated that he wanted to speed his recovery and help his team.

McNamee traveled to Tampa at Pettitte’s request and spent about ten days assisting Pettitte with his rehabilitation. McNamee recalled that he injected Pettitte with human growth hormone that McNamee obtained from Radomski on two to four occasions. Pettitte paid McNamee for the trip and his expenses; there was no separate payment for the human growth hormone.

According to McNamee, around the time in 2003 that the BALCO searches became public, Pettitte asked what he should say if a reporter asked Pettitte whether he ever used performance enhancing substances. McNamee told him he was free to say what he wanted, but that he should not go out of his way to bring it up. McNamee also asked Pettitte not to mention his name. McNamee never discussed these substances with Pettitte again.

After the 2001 season, Pettitte, like Clemens, continued to use McNamee’s services and to serve as a source of income after McNamee was dismissed by the Yankees. In a 2006 article, Pettitte “acknowledged an ongoing relationship” with McNamee. Pettitte was quoted as having said that he still talked to McNamee about once a week. “Mac has trained me professionally for a long time, and I’ll continue to use Mac,” Pettitte said.

In order to provide Pettitte with information about these allegations and to give him an opportunity to respond, I asked him to meet with me; he declined.

Now take that for what it's worth. Clemens an avid steroid abuser, and Pettitte an HGH user looking to heal quicker. Even in these most prominent portions of the report, there are holes.

This doesn't show us the complete timeline for when Clemens took steroids. It tells us that he took steroids while he knew McNamee, starting in 1998, but that doesn't answer the questions, when did he start, and when did he stop?

Perhaps this is the most stunning paragraph in the entire report:

Later that summer, Clemens asked McNamee to inject him with Winstrol, which Clemens supplied. McNamee knew the substance was Winstrol because the vials Clemens gave him were so labeled. McNamee injected Clemens approximately four times in the buttocks over a several-week period with needles that Clemens provided. Each incident took place in Clemens’ apartment at the SkyDome. McNamee never asked Clemens where he obtained the steroids.

So obviously Clemens, who asked McNamee to inject him because he couldn't do it himself, had experience with steroids prior to this engagement with McNamee. What we don't know is how much experience. And we don't know when he actually stopped using steroids. We just know when McNamee stopped injecting him, which doesn't mean he stopped using altogether.

So is there a sequel we should be waiting for?

Throughout the report, there are holes, and many questions left unanswered. The perception is that there was only one main steroid and HGH distributor in Radomski. However, that certainly is not true. Mitchell's report was meant for an audience that knows performance-enhancing drugs are prevalent in the sport, so it's almost a slap in the face to the average baseball fan to base an entire investigation on just one distributor, when that fan knows there are more than one, they just don't know who they are, or who they distributed to.

That was Mitchell's job.

Finding the family tree of steroid distributors would undoubtedly catch hundreds of impact players buying and taking performance-enhancing drugs. But what Mitchell did was focus on just one branch of that very large tree.

Without McNamee, there's no Clemens or Pettitte. Without McNamee, there's no Radomski. And without Radomski, there's certainly no Mitchell report.

Well there is a Mitchell report. It is 409 pages. But if we've learned anything, it's that we need to just move on.

What now?

The biggest question of all.

In fairness to Mitchell, he had absolutely no support from the MLB Players Association. He also had no subpoena power, which made it very difficult to dig deep. And that's the overall problem here. Without support from the Players Association, there's only so much the league can do to move on from the steroid era, especially now with a growing concern for finding an HGH test that would require each players' blood samples.

The reason players won't cooperate is because they either believe it's a witch hunt for users - past and present - or because of they live by what Rob Manfred, executive vice president for labor relations, called the "code of silence" in baseball clubhouses.

From the report:

In the course of this investigation, examples of the “code of silence” were abundant. A number of witnesses, for example, claimed that they knew nothing about steroids, never saw anything involving steroids, and had never even heard the word “steroids” used in a major league clubhouse, not even in connection with such high-profile issues as the leaked BALCO grand jury testimony, the publicity about Barry Bonds, the March 2005 congressional hearings, Rafael Palmeiro’s failed drug test thereafter, or the Jason Grimsley search warrant affidavit in June 2006.

In our interview of him, one former player told of annual players-only meetings during which teammates reminded one another that any personal information they learned during the season needed to be kept in “the family.” He said that players understood that a failure to abide by this unwritten rule would sound the death knell for their careers. Through his lawyer, another former player who admitted his own use of performance enhancing substances claimed that his career as a major league coach would be harmed “perhaps fatally” if he were required to identify other players who had admitted to him that they had used steroids.

Interviews of non-player employees, and of other witnesses who might have knowledge of a player’s illegal use of performance enhancing substances, are not governed by baseball’s collective bargaining agreement (which applies only to major league players) but are still affected by the “code of silence.”

So again, in fairness to Mitchell, he wasn't working with much, which is why his report came up short. Without McNamee's detailed interview on Clemens' steroid use, the entire report would be worthless.

And don't waste my time saying you don't believe the information on Clemens because McNamee was a "troubled man threatened with possible prison time." Please. This would probably be coming from the same people who've been all over Barry Bonds for juicing, ever since his ex-girlfriend threw a few jabs at him. You believed her didn't you?

So do me a favor, treat Clemens the same because if this report does anything, it gives fans a name that matches the celebrity status of Bonds. You can't come out and say Clemens was still a Hall of Famer before he started taking steroids, and not say the same for Bonds. Because as I stated earlier, we have no evidence that Clemens' first injection was in 1998 with McNamee. After all, it was Clemens that supplied it in the first place.

And as stated in the report, like Bonds and every other player named, Clemens had a chance to speak with Mitchell during the investigation to make his case for being clean.

I asked to meet with all of the players about whom allegations of their possession or use of performance enhancing substances are discussed in this chapter in order to provide them with information about those allegations and to give them an opportunity to respond. With few exceptions that are noted below, none of them agreed.

Like Bonds, Clemens declined to defend himself then. And in case you thought he was just following the "code of silence" why then didn't he have his lawyers say something when he was immediately contacted by Mitchell? How come nobody came out denying it then? Clemens obviously knew he'd be named in the report if he was contact by Mitchell, so why did he wait?

Clemens deserves to take just as much heat as Bonds, and they both deserve to take just as much blame as anyone else in the report, or anyone else that ever abused performance-enhancing drugs.

But the problem is, we don't have those names in front of us. The Mitchell report didn't provide us the evidence to blame any other impact players in the game. So all we can do is go back to our "list of speculation."

Or we can just move on. We can end the "witch hunt" and leave the record book as is. We can put an end to the blame, and focus on the future. That is truly the only way this thing will make any sense to the kids that we're supposed to be teaching anti-steroid use to.

Any more investigations, any more books, and any more reports are just going to leave us with more and more unanswered questions, because as we know, the Players Association isn't going to cooperate. And you could sit there and blame them, but you wouldn't get anywhere.

So like I said, end the blame, and move on. The less time and effort spent focusing on the past, the more time and effort there is to eliminate steroids and HGH from the game completely.

After all, that is the point here, isn't it?

Missing out on a few more Marlins

Theo Epstein looks to be on the verge of completing a trade for Johan Santana, but the Red Sox may have missed out on a package deal that better suits their future

Don't get me wrong, Johan Santana is a beast. And I'm not using playful words. He is a true beast. I mean, you've got Rambo, Incredible Hulk, Beowulf, and then Santana.

There is nothing bad about adding him to your team. If the Red Sox pull off a trade that sends Jon Lester, Coco Crisp, and two prospects to Minnesota for the stud lefty, then it makes Boston an immediate favorite to win the 2008 World Series, if it wasn't already.

But allow me to put my general manager's cap on for a moment (I don't actually have a GM hat, so take it easy on the e-mails please).

This offseason began with Alex Rodriguez, and which big market team he would sign with. After he got his $300 million deal with the Yankees, World Series MVP Mike Lowell became one of the bigger names on the free agent market. Not being as hot a commodity as first thought, he re-signed with the Red Sox.

A few other obvious re-signings later (Rivera and Posada), and the hot stove turned into a manhunt for starting pitchers.

Enter Santana. Enter Dan Haren. Enter Dontrelle Willis.

Santana easily becomes the most wanted arm on the trade block. Haren becomes the backup plan. And Willis is the "OK, we might as well add something to our rotation."

That is, unless you can somehow create a package deal landing you Miguel Cabrera and Willis, which is exactly what the Detroit Tigers did Tuesday night.

As Boston continues serious discussions with the Twins, the Tigers sent outfielder Cameron Maybin, pitcher Andrew Miller, and catcher Mike Rabelo to Florida for the pair of All-Stars.

In hindsight, this is a deal the Red Sox should have pulled the trigger on, instead of trying to keep Santana out of New York. Maybe you can blame the San Francisco Giants for signing Barry Zito to a 7-year, $126 million deal last offseason. Or maybe you can just be realistic when it comes to the future of Manny Ramirez.

Ramirez turns 36 in May, and the last year on his contract (not including the team option) is 2008. He'll be paid $20 million, and if the Red Sox choose, they can pick up their options on him in 2009 and 2010, paying Ramirez $20 million per season at the ages of 37 and 38.

Picking up his option years would mean Boston loses their cleanup hitter and gets nothing in return. Wouldn't be the best move for a team that would then have to throw up the big bucks for a big bat in 2011, after already giving Santana and Josh Beckett historic contract extensions. Not to mention David Ortiz can become a free agent at the age of 36 after 2011.

This is looking into the crystal ball. But that's what general managers do. They commit their lives to making their team competitive on a yearly basis. And in Major League Baseball, big market clubs like Boston have the money to be championship contenders each year.

With all that in mind, what's the most important issue the Red Sox face over the next three years? It's certainly not pitching.

Exit Ramirez and a few top prospects. Enter Cabrera. Enter Willis. Enter a young catcher to replace Jason Varitek, 35, after next season.

Trading young prospects for the sure thing, especially starting pitching, is something you have to do. Santana is no exception. You only have to look as far as the trade for Beckett two years ago to see that it's the best decision to make as a GM. But this offseason is different for Boston.

After the 2005 season, the Red Sox had watched Matt Clement, who they thought to be their new ace, get shelled for eight runs (three home runs) in 3 1/3 innings of a Game 1 ALDS loss to the Chicago White Sox. The White Sox swept Boston in that series, leading to a much-needed move for a new young ace. Beckett was their guy, even though they gave up a lot (Hanley Ramirez and Anibal Sanchez) to get him.

After last season, there isn't much demand for a big arm in the rotation, especially when that big arm will be looking for an extension worth more than what Zito was given last year. And you might as well be ready to announce Beckett's long-term payday at the Santana introductory press conference.

Don't get me wrong, the Santana deal, like I've said from the beginning, is a great deal, considering you may not even have to give up Clay Buchholz or Jacoby Ellsbury. It's a steal. But once A-Rod came off the market, you had to look at the future of Boston's powerhouse offense. Ramirez immediately comes to mind.

And with minimal pitching worries this offseason, and after letting the overwhelming thought of Santana joining your ball club sink in, looking to deal Ramirez should be the priority it's been in the past.

It wasn't so long ago (2003 to be exact) that Manny was put on irrevocable waivers, allowing any team in the league to pick up his contract with the Red Sox being unable to counter that team's claim, essentially losing Ramirez for nothing.

Four years later, Boston can thank the rest of the league for passing up on him. But they can't face a situation where they lose this guy for nothing again. So here's something that could have worked:

- Put together a package of young talent that didn't include Ellsbury, and send it to Florida for Cabrera and Willis.
- Trade Manny and Coco Crisp for a young catcher.

It's not the most complicated scenario in the world. And it would have made sense on so many levels. The only difficulty would have been finding a team with that coveted young catcher, and hope that same team would want Ramirez' $20 million contract in return.

Texas' Jarrod Saltalamacchia, 22, is a catcher the Red Sox had inquired about before he was traded to the Rangers from Atlanta last season. We also know that Texas was looking at Crisp, and that it nearly traded the best player in the game - A-Rod - for Ramirez after the 2003 season.

Then the Red Sox would've had to give large extensions to just Beckett and Cabrera, instead of dishing out boat loads of cash to Beckett, Santana, and a new cleanup slugger off the free agent market in a few years.

Let's face it, Willis is a phenomenal talent even though he struggled last season (10-15, 5.17 ERA). But to say the 25 year old (26 in January) is washed up has to be coming from someone who just doesn't know baseball. The kid was 22-10 with a 2.63 ERA and 170 strikeouts in 2005, and played a big role, along with Beckett, in leading the Marlins to a world championship in 2003 with a 14-6 record his rookie year.

While he's further away than Santana from a Zito-like deal, Willis could have been had at a discount. The Tigers gave up a specimen in Maybin, but that's because Cabrera was involved. Willis was an afterthought, yet a huge addition to any rotation.

Reminds me of a trade with Florida that involved a certain "throw-in." Next thing you know, Lowell was a World Series MVP. So don't give me the "we wouldn't have wanted Willis because he's coming off a poor season" argument. He's a kid in need of an atmosphere change. He's a winner.

And do I really need to go into how great a hitter Cabrera is? The guy's already been crowned as the next Manny throughout the league. He's only 24, and consistently drives in 110-plus RBIs a season. Meanwhile, Ramirez' RBI total dipped below 100 in 2007 (88) for the first time since he drove in 88 runs with Cleveland in 1997.

I wasn't necessarily all about a trade for Cabrera while knowing A-Rod was still on the market because I'll take A-Rod for the next 10 years over anyone in the game, no matter how much he costs. But once he returned to New York, and Lowell re-signed, my first thought was Cabrera in left field, a move he will eventually make, by the way, regardless of where he's playing.

So now we wait on Santana, which isn't a done deal by any means. If it falls through, the Red Sox are still in very good shape. But for now, Detroit may have stolen their backup plan.

And for the the future, Boston may regret not making Cabrera and Willis their top priority.